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TITLE VII DISCRIMINATION PROTECTIONS &
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THE NEED FOR CONSISTENCY, CERTAINTY
& EQUALITY POST-OBERGEFELL
REGINA LAMBERT HILLMAN*
“We are confronted primarily with a moral issue. It is as old as the scriptures
and it is as clear as the American Constitution. The heart of the question is
whether all Americans are afforded equal rights and equal opportunities,
whether we are going to treat our fellow Americans as we want to be
treated . . . .”
President John F. Kennedy1
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I.

TITLE VII, CONFUSION & CONTRADICTION

Employment protections from discriminatory practices for LGBT2
Americans are fraught with uncertainties and inconsistencies. While the
LGBT community has experienced historical civil rights advances in the
recent past, those advances have raised new legal dilemmas and led to
confusion and unpredictability, particularly in the area of employment law.
Legal protections in the workforce against discriminatory employment
practices have not kept pace with advances in constitutional rights now
available for LGBT employees.3 Due to the fact that regulation of
employment discrimination varies by jurisdiction, whether legal protections
are available to LGBT employees based on sexual orientation and/or gender
identity depends on factors such as whether the employment is public or
2. “LGBT” is an acronym for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender. Although
“LGBTQ” is often used to fully recognize the diversity of the LGBT community, this article
utilizes LGBT to comport with the majority of legal cases, articles, and agencies.
3. Sexual Orientation Discrimination, WORKPLACE FAIRNESS, https://www.workplac
efairness.org/sexual-orientation-discrimination (last visited Nov. 18, 2018).
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private, state or federal, and the geographic location where the action takes
place. Almost four years after the Supreme Court announced a constitutional
right to marry for same-sex couples, laws remain that permit an employer to
fire a gay or lesbian employee for exercising that very right, and there
remains no federal law in place prohibiting employment discrimination on
the basis of gender identity or sexual orientation.4
With an estimated 6.5 million LGBT employees in the United States
workforce, employment discrimination and the state of available workplace
protections present a significant and serious concern.5 Despite numerous
historical advances, including Supreme Court recognition of the “dignity”
that LGBT relationships deserve when recognizing a constitutional right to
same-sex marriage,6 hate crimes legislation protecting the LGBT
community,7 and changes to military qualification criteria,8 employment law
has simply failed to keep up. Further, while Supreme Court jurisprudence
providing an expansive view of “sex” has led to protections for employees
discriminated against on the basis of gender identity, the federal appellate
courts are split, along with federal agencies, regarding whether LGBT
employees are entitled to protections from discrimination in the workplace
based on sexual orientation.9 The lack of coherent, uniformly recognized
laws has prevented consistent legal outcomes and applications for employers
and employees alike and undermined advancements in LGBT rights.
4. See infra Section III. While state employment protections for LGBT employees are
not addressed in this article, according to Out & Equal’s 2017 Workplace Equality Factsheet,
“in 28 states, you can get fired just for being lesbian, bisexual, or gay” and “in 30 states, you
can be fired for being transgender.” Only “[t]wenty-two states and the District of Columbia
prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and/or gender identity
by statute.” 2017 Workplace Equality Fact Sheet, OUT & EQUAL WORKPLACE ADVOCATES,
http://outandequal.org/2017-workplace-equality-fact-sheet/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2018)
[hereinafter “Workplace Equality Fact Sheet].
5. Ecker, Lori, Discrimination in Employment Issues for LGBT Individuals, AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/pub
lications/tyl/topics/sexual-orientation-gender-identity/discrimination-in-employment-issuesfor-lgbt-individuals.html.
6. When recognizing the constitutional right to same-sex marriage, Justice Kennedy
penned, “They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them that
right.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015).
7. In 2009, President Obama signed the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd Jr. Hate
Crimes Prevention Act of 2009, expanding the definition of violent federal hate crimes to
those committed because of a victim’s sexual orientation. 18 U.S.C. § 249 (2009).
8. See Repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, https://www.
hrc.org/resources/the-repeal-of-dont-ask-dont-tell (last visited Sept. 20, 2018). On December
22, 2010, President Obama signed legislation repealing Don’t Ask Don’t Tell, “allowing gay,
lesbian, and bisexual Americans to serve openly in the Armed Forces without fear of being
dismissed from service because of who they are and who they love, putting in motion the end
of a discriminatory policy that ran counter to American values.” FACT SHEET: Obama
Administration’s Record and the LGBT Community, WHITE HOUSE (June 9, 2017),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/06/09/fact-sheet-obamaadministrations-record-and-lgbt-community.
9. See infra Section VIII.
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While there is not a federal law that provides employment
discrimination protections based on LGBT status,10 advocates for LGBT
employment protections argue that the ban on sex discrimination in Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”)11 applies to LGBT employees.12
This argument asserts that firing, harassing, failing to promote, or otherwise
discriminating against an employee based on his or her LGBT status is a form
of sex stereotyping that illegally discriminates against the employee based on
his or her gender identity or sexual orientation that deviates from
stereotypical male and female expectations.13
In recent years, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC” or “Commission”), the leading federal law enforcement agency
charged with both preventing and remedying employment antidiscrimination laws and advancing equal opportunity in the workforce while
enforcing federal laws prohibiting employment discrimination,14 has

10. This Article does not address the years of attempts at passing federal legislation to
provide employment protections to LGBT employees. For a thorough discussion of the
Employment Non-Discrimination Act (“ENDA”) and the Equality Act of 2015, see Shalyn L.
Caulley, The Next Frontier to LGBT Equality: Securing Workplace-Discrimination
Protections, 2017 U. Ill. L. Rev. 909 (2017); see also Alex Reed, RFRA v. ENDA: Religious
Freedom and Employment Discrimination, 23 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 1 (2016).
11. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1994); see Protection for LGBT
Employees Under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, HUMAN RIGHTS MAGAZINE (Oct. 23,
2012), https://www.americanbar.org/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/human_
rights_vol31_2004/summer2004/irr_hr_summer04_protectlgbt/. For a history of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, see Shannon Bond, Married on Saturday and Fired on Monday: Hively
v. Ivy Tech Community College: Resolving the Disconnect Under Title VII, 97 NEB. L. REV.
225, 228 (2018); see also, William N. Eskridge, Jr., Title VII’s Statutory History and the Sex
Discrimination Argument for LGBT Workplace Protections, 127 YALE L.J. 322 (Nov. 2017).
12. U.S. appeals court says Title VII covers discrimination based on sexual orientation,
U.S. LEGAL NEWS (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-lgbt/u-s-appealscourt-says-title-vii-covers-discrimination-based-on-sexual-orientation-idUSKCN1GA201.
See also infra Section VIII.
13. See infra Section VIII. For a detailed view of LGBT employment law, see Darrell
Vandeusen & Alexander Berg, The Developing Law of LGBT Protections under Title VII,
LEXIS PRAC. ADVISOR J. (June 3, 2016), https://www.lexisnexis.com/lexis-practiceadvisor/the-journal/b/lpa/archive/2016/06/02/the-developing-law-of-lgbt-protections-undertitle-vii.aspx.
14. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, About EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/
eeoc/index.cfm (last visited Sept. 16, 2018) (The EEOC “is responsible for enforcing federal
laws that make it illegal to discriminate in employment against a job applicant, employee, or
former employee because of the person’s race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy),
national origin, age (40 or older), disability or genetic information.”). When the Civil Rights
Act, including Title VII, was passed, “the Commission’s most significant early interpretations
concerned the basic definition of discrimination, not provided in the statutory language of
Title VII.” Shaping Employment Discrimination Law, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N 35TH ANNIVERSARY, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/1965-71/shaping.html
(last visited Sept. 24, 2018). For a detailed history of Title VII’s development after the Civil
Rights Act of 1964’s passage see Juliet R. Aiken, Elizabeth D. Salmon and Paul J. Hanges,
The Origins and Legacy of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 28 J. OF BUS. AND PSYCHOL. 4, 383
(1993).
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similarly interpreted Title VII to extend to LGBT employees.15 Although
Title VII does not expressly prohibit employment discrimination based on
LGBT status, the EEOC has extended Title VII prohibitions on sex
discrimination to prohibit discrimination on the basis of both gender identity
and sexual orientation.16 In the determination that discrimination based on
gender identity17 and sexual orientation18 are included within Title VII’s
prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex, the Commission clarified
that “it [did] not recognize[] any new protected characteristics under Title
VII,” but simply “applied existing Title VII precedents to sex discrimination

15. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, What You Should Know About EEOC
and the Enforcement Protections for LGBT Workers, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/
wysk/enforcement_protections_lgbt_workers.cfm#overview (last visited Sept. 16, 2018)
[hereinafter “What You Should Know”]. While Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does
not explicitly include sexual orientation or gender identity in its list of protected bases, the
Commission, consistent with Supreme Court case law holding that employment actions
motivated by gender stereotyping are unlawful sex discrimination and other court decisions,
interprets the statute’s sex discrimination provision as prohibiting discrimination against
employees on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.
Further, according to the EEOC website, “Discrimination against an individual because
of gender identity, including transgender status, or because of sexual orientation is
discrimination because of sex in violation of Title VII.” Id. The EEOC “protections apply
regardless of any contrary state or local laws.” Id; see also Paul Pettern & Michelle Phillips,
EEOC: Title VII Prohibits Employment Discrimination Based on Gender Identity, Sexual
Orientation, JACKSON LEWIS (July 21, 2016), https://www.jacksonlewis.com/publication/
eeoc-title-vii-prohibits-employment-discrimination-based-gender-identity-sexualorientation.
16. As noted on the EEOC website:
Although Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not explicitly include
sexual orientation or gender identity, the EEOC and courts have said that sex
discrimination includes discrimination based on an applicant or employee’s
gender identity or sexual orientation. For example, it is illegal for an employer
to deny employment opportunities or permit harassment because:
•

A woman does not dress or talk in a feminine manner.

•

A man dresses in an effeminate manner or enjoys a pastime (like
crocheting) that is associated with women.

•

A female employee dates women instead of men.

•

A male employee plans to marry a man.

•

An employee is planning or has made a gender transition from female to
male or male to female.

What You Should Know, supra note 15.
17. See Macy, E.E.O.C. Appeal No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995 (Apr. 20, 2012)
(holding that Title VII prohibits discrimination based on gender identity).
18. See Baldwin, E.E.O.C. Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641 (July 15, 2015)
(holding that Title VII prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation).
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claims raised by LGBT individuals.”19 The Commission has reiterated its
position through both amicus briefs and in litigation filed against private
employers.20 However, while the EEOC has held that Title VII provides
protection against discrimination based on both gender identity and sexual
orientation, EEOC rulings are merely persuasive authority and provide no
binding effect on United States federal courts.21
Nonetheless, numerous federal courts have been persuaded by the
argument, and there is currently a growing trend in the federal appellate
courts to recognize that both gender identity and sexual orientation
discrimination are encompassed by Title VII’s prohibition on sex
discrimination.22 While some state and local governments prohibit
discrimination based on sexual orientation and/or sexual identity, there
remain numerous states where an employee can be legally fired based on his
or her LGBT status.23 And although the vast majority of Fortune 500
companies provide legal protection from discriminatory practices to LGBT
employees, those protections do not extend to many parts of the private
sector,24 leading to a confusing state of affairs to navigate and unequal
outcomes for employers and employees alike.
Further, while the EEOC’s clear position and current Strategic
Enforcement Plan (“SEP”) specifically state that Title VII does provide
protection from discrimination to LGBT employees,25 the current
presidential administration has taken a contrary position and explicitly stated
that Title VII does not provide protection from discrimination to LGBT
employees.26 In fact, under Trump’s presidency the federal government has
not only changed course to deny Title VII protection provided to LGBT

19. What You Should Know, supra note 15. See infra note 20, re: amicus briefs and
litigation against private companies.
20. See, e.g., Eure v. Sage Corp., 61 F. Supp. 3d 651 (W.D. Tex. 2014) (amicus brief
filed Apr. 22, 2015, addressing Title VII and transgender status/gender identity). See also
Christiansen v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 2013) (amicus brief filed June 28,
2016); Evans v. Georgia Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017) (amicus brief filed Jan.
11, 2016) (addressing Title VII and sexual orientation).
21. “The weight of deference afforded to agency interpretations . . . depends upon the
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade.” Univ.
of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 360 (2013) (internal quotations omitted).
22. See infra Sections VII and VIII.
23. See Workplace Equality Fact Sheet, supra note 4.
24. Corporate Equality Index 2017, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUND.,
http://assets2.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/CEI-2017-FinalReport.pdf (last visited Sept. 22,
2018).
25. What You Should Know, supra note 15.
26. Memorandum from the Office of the Att’y Gen. to U.S. Attorneys and Heads of
Department Components on Revised Treatment of Transgender Employment Discrimination
Claims Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Oct. 4, 2017),
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4067383/Attachment-2.pdf [hereinafter
“Sessions Memo”].
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employees under President Obama and in concert with the EEOC, it has also
directly opposed the EEOC’s position in federal court.27
To add to the confusion, many federal courts applying Supreme
Court precedent distinguish between employment discrimination based on
gender identity and sexual orientation, leading to the problematic and
irreconcilable outcome that transgender and/or stereotypically gay and
lesbian presenting employees may receive protections that are denied to nonstereotypical presenting gay and lesbian employees.28 As a result, in some
jurisdictions, a lesbian employee can celebrate her now constitutional right
to marry her same-sex partner over the weekend and find herself legally fired
the following Monday for exercising that very right.29
While some feel it is critical for Congress to amend Title VII to
include LGBT status to the list of protected classes,30 it is likely that the issue
will be resolved through the courts as the Supreme Court granted certiorari
to hear three cases in the upcoming 2019–20 Term.31 Based on the current
federal circuit court divide and conflicting interpretations of Title VII by
federal agencies, the Supreme Court’s certiorari grant will hopefully provide
much-needed resolution.32 Of further concern to LGBT advocates is whether
current changes in the Court’s makeup33 may shift the prior Court’s narrow
27. See infra Section VI discussing the DOJ and EEOC filing opposing amicus briefs.
28. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, Examples of Court Decisions
Supporting Coverage of LGBT-Related Discrimination Under Title VII, https://www.eeoc.
gov/eeoc/newsroom/wysk/lgbt_examples_decisions.cfm (last visited Oct. 23, 2018).
29. Bond, supra note 11.
30. See, e.g., William C. Sung, Taking the Fight Back to Title VII: A Case for Redefining
“Because of Sex” to Include Gender Stereotypes, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity, 84
S. CAL. L. REV. 487, 493 (2011) (arguing to amend Title VII prohibition on sex discrimination
to include discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity).
31. On Monday, April 22, 2019, the Supreme Court justices agreed to review the issue
of whether LGBT employees are protected from discrimination under federal employment
laws. After considering the cases at eleven consecutive conferences beginning on September
24, 2018, certiorari was granted in Altitude Express v. Zarda, No. 17-1618 (addressing
“[w]hether the prohibition in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(1), against employment discrimination “because of . . . sex” encompasses discrimination
based on an individual’s sexual orientation”), Bostock v. Clayton, No. 17-1623 (addressing
[w]hether discrimination against an employee because of sexual orientation constitutes
prohibited employment discrimination “because of . . . sex” within the meaning of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2”) (both cases have been consolidated
and will be collectively referred to as No. 17-1618), and R.G. & G.R. Harris, No. 18-107
(addressing “[w]hether Title VII prohibits discrimination against transgender people based on
(1) their status as transgender or (2) sex stereotyping under Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
U. S. 228 (1989)). See also infra notes 249–54 and accompanying text.
32. See supra note 31 and accompanying text; infra notes 249–54 and accompanying
text.
33. READ: Justice Anthony Kennedy’s Retirement Letter, CNN POLITICS (June 27,
2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/27/politics/read-justice-anthony-kennedy-retirementletter/index.html. Justice Kennedy was the swing vote and author of the majority opinions in
all Supreme Court cases favoring the advancement of LGBT rights, including striking down
laws preventing LGBT citizens from being recognized as a protected class, Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620 (1996); striking down sodomy laws, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003);
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forward-leaning majority in favor of LGBT rights into reverse.34 If so,
current Title VII rulings providing protection from discrimination to LGBT
employees may be at risk.
II.

TITLE VII & THE SUPREME COURT

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196435 prohibits employers from
discriminating against an individual employee “with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. . . .”36 It
provides protections for employees of all private sector and state and local
government employers that employ at least fifteen employees, as well as
applicants and civilian employees of federal government agencies.37 The
relevant part of Title VII clarifies that any discriminatory practice “because
of such individual’s . . . sex” is prohibited.38 Since its 1964 inception when
Title VII was construed narrowly, the Supreme Court has clarified and
expanded its interpretation of “because of . . . sex,” including finding that
Title VII also prohibits sexual harassment and hostile work environments.39
In the 1989 landmark case, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Court
granted certiorari to resolve a split in the circuits over the respective burdens
of proof of the parties in a Title VII case “when it has been shown that an
employment decision resulted from a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate

striking down portions of the federal Defense of Marriage Act, United States v. Windsor, 570
U.S. 744 (2013); and voting in favor of a constitutional right to same-sex marriage, Obergefell
v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015). See Boris Dittrich, US Justice
Kennedy’s Legacy on Gay Rights Key Rights Protections Hinge on Choice of Replacement,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/07/08/us-justice-kennedys-legacygay-right (last visited Sept. 22, 2018).
34. All of the Court’s cases advancing rights for LGBT citizens were a narrow 5-4 split.
See cases cited supra note 33. See also Emanuella Grinberg, She came out as transgender and
got fired. Now her case might become a test for LGBTQ rights before the US Supreme Court,
CNN POLITICS (Sept. 3, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/29/politics
/harris-funeral-homes-lawsuit/index.html (addressing what the change in the Court could
mean to LGBT legal advances).
35. For a detailed history of the enactment and progression of Title VII, see William N.
Eskridge Jr., Title VII’s Statutory History and the Sex Discrimination Argument for LGBT
Workplace Protections, 127 YALE L.J. 322, 331 (2017) (noting that “any judicial interpretation
of Title VII’s text, purpose, or precedents is incomplete, from any methodological point of
view, without an exploration and understanding of the statutory history (congressional
amendments and authoritative interpretations) as well as the legislative history of Title VII
and its amendments) (emphasis in original).
36. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
37. Id. at § 2000e(b).
38. Id. at § 2000e-2(a)(1).
39. In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the Court unanimously held that sexual
harassment was a Title VII violation. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,
the Court addressed Title VII’s application to a hostile work environment. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
See Eskridge, supra note 35 (providing an in-depth analysis of Title VII’s history and
progression).
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motives.”40 In Price Waterhouse, a female employee was denied a promotion
partially because colleagues did not feel that she acted or dressed like they
believed a woman should act and dress.41 The employee was informed that
she could improve her chances for a promotion if she would “walk more
femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up,
have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”42 The employee brought a Title VII
lawsuit alleging that the employer had illegally discriminated against her on
the basis of sex.43
The Price Waterhouse Court focused on Title VII’s prohibition
against employment discrimination “because of such individual’s . . . sex”44
and addressed discrimination based on “sex stereotypes,” using the terms
“sex” and “gender” interchangeably.45 In doing so, a plurality of the Price
Waterhouse Court expressly found that “in forbidding employers to
discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to
strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women
resulting from sex stereotypes” when implementing Title VII.46 Therefore,
the Court held that Title VII prohibited discrimination based on gender
stereotyping.47 While the Court noted that “an employer who acts on the
basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be,
has acted on the basis of gender,”48 it clarified that while “stereotyped
remarks can certainly be evidence that gender played a part”49 in a Title VII
action, the key question is always whether “stereotyping played a motivating
role in an employment decision.”50 Simply put, the Court held that in order
to comply with Title VII, “gender must be irrelevant to employment
decisions.”51

40. 490 U.S. 228, 232 (1989).
41. Id. at 235.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 231–32.
44. Id. at 240 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1), (2)) (emphasis in original).
45. Id. at 251.
46. Id. (quoting L.A. Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13
(1978) (internal quotations omitted)).
47. Id. at 240 (“We take these words to mean that gender must be irrelevant to
employment decisions.”).
48. Id. at 250.
49. Id. at 251.
50. Id. at 252.
51. Id. at 240. The Court explained that
Title VII meant to condemn even those decisions based on a mixture of
legitimate and illegitimate concerns. When, therefore, an employer considers
both gender and legitimate factors at the time of making a decision, that
decision was ‘because of’ sex’ and the other, legitimate considerations – even
if we may say later, in the context of litigation, that the decision would have
been the same if gender had not been taken into account.
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Almost a decade after Price Waterhouse, the Court held that Title
VII also covers same-sex harassment claims.52 In Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Servs., Inc., a male employee was forced to quit his job after
suffering severe sexual harassment and verbal abuse by fellow male
coworkers and supervisors.53 The former employee subsequently filed a
complaint alleging discrimination based on sex.54 The district court held that
there was no cause of action for same-sex sexual harassment, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.55
The Oncale Court found that while same-sex harassment was not the
“principal evil” Title VII was enacted to prevent, “statutory prohibitions
often go beyond the principle evil to cover reasonably comparable evils[.]”56
The Court noted that “it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than
the principle concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.”57 Thus,
the Court held that because “Title VII prohibits ‘discriminat[ion] . . . because
of . . . sex,’” those protections “include[] . . . sexual harassment of any kind
that meets the statutory requirements.”58 In doing so, the Court held that
same-sex harassment claims were covered by Title VII.59
The pair of Supreme Court decisions in Price Waterhouse and
Oncale provided the foundational basis for later federal agency policy
justifications, federal court holdings, en banc appellate court re-hearings, and
recently granted certiorari petitions arguing that employment discrimination
based on gender identity and/or sexual orientation is prohibited by Title VII.60
III.

THE EEOC’S IMPORTANT ROLE IN ADVANCING LGBT
EMPLOYEE RIGHTS

As the leading federal law enforcement agency charged with both
preventing and remedying employment discrimination and advancing equal
opportunity,61 the EEOC is also responsible for enforcing federal laws
Id. at 241. The Court also noted, “If an employee’s flawed interpersonal skills can be corrected
by a soft hued suit or a new shade of lipstick, perhaps it is the employee’s sex and not her
‘interpersonal skills’ that has drawn the criticism.” Id. at 256.
52. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998). The Court noted that
“nothing in Title VII necessarily bars a claim of discrimination ‘because of . . . sex’ merely
because the plaintiff and the defendant . . . are of the same sex.” Id. at 79.
53. Id. at 77.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 79.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 80.
59. Id.
60. See infra Sections IV, V, VII, and VIII for examples of the EEOC, the Second and
Seventh Circuit Courts, and recently granted certiorari petitions utilizing Price Waterhouse
and Oncale to further LGBT employment protections under Title VII.
61. See What You Should Know, supra note 15, re: specific enforcement responsibilities
of the EEOC.
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prohibiting employment discrimination.62 When a discrimination report is
filed with the Commission and the Commission finds reasonable cause to
believe that discrimination has taken place, it first seeks to resolve the matter
voluntarily, including “informal methods of conference, conciliation, and
persuasion.”63 If a voluntary resolution is not possible, the EEOC has the
authority to file a lawsuit in federal court.64
A.

The EEOC’s Current Strategic Enforcement Plan (“SEP”)65

Every four years, Congress requires executive departments,
government corporations, and independent agencies to develop a SEP.66 The
EEOC’s SEP provides a foundation for achieving its mission to prevent and
remedy unlawful employment discrimination, advance equal opportunity in
the workforce, and promote inclusive workplaces.67 In a February 12, 2018,
press release, the EEOC announced approval for its current SEP for Fiscal
Years 2018–2022.68
The EEOC’s current SEP received unanimous approval, and the
EEOC’s Acting Chair noted that through the SEP the EEOC was taking a
significant step toward “realizing [its] vision of ‘[r]espectful and inclusive
workplaces, with equal employment opportunity for all.’”69 In the 2018–
2022 SEP, for the first time in history, the EEOC expressly noted that it was
a “top enforcement priority” to include the “coverage of lesbian, gay,
bisexual and transgender individuals under Title VII’s sex discrimination
provisions.”70 Addressing emerging and developing issues related to LGBT
employees under Title VII’s sex discrimination provisions was included as
one of six national priorities identified in the EEOC’s SEP.71
62. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5 (West 2012).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years
2018–2022, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/strategic_plan_18-22.cfm#mission (last visited
Sept. 25, 2018) [hereinafter “Strategic Plan 2018–2022”].
66. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, Strategic Enforcement Plan for Fiscal
Years 2017–2021, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/sep-2017.cfm (last visited Sept. 22, 2018)
[hereinafter “Strategic Enforcement Plan 2017–2021”]. A strategic enforcement plan (“SEP”)
directs an agency’s work and lays a foundation for the development of more detailed annual
plans, budgets, and performance information and must be posted on the organization’s public
website. Id.
67. See Strategic Plan 2018–2022, supra note 65.
68. See id.
69. Id.
70. Strategic Enforcement Plan 2017–2021, supra note 66.
71. See id. At the time of this writing, the current Commission has three vacancies and
lacks a quorum. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, The Commission and the General
Counsel, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/commission.cfm (last visited Apr. 2, 2019). While
President Trump nominated two republicans and one democrat to fill the vacancies, a
Republican senator, unhappy with the openly gay Democrat nominee who served two prior
terms, blocked a confirmation vote by the Senate, causing the Democrat nominee’s term to
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B.

The EEOC Determines Title VII Applies to Transgender
Employees

The EEOC’s road to determining that Title VII provides protections
to LGBT employees72 is a relatively short one, less than half a decade,
beginning when it found that discrimination based on gender identity was
covered under Title VII’s protections.73 In 2012, the EEOC made the
landmark decision that a “complaint of discrimination based on gender
identity, change of sex, and/or transgender status is cognizable under Title
VII” as a form of discrimination based on “sex.”74
In Macy v. Holder,75 a transgender complainant asserted that she was
discriminated against by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives (“ATFE”) on the basis of her “sex, gender identity (transgender
woman) and on the basis of sex stereotyping” when she was not selected for
a position she was qualified for due to her gender change from male to
female.76 An issue arose regarding whether portions of the complaint
alleging discrimination based on gender identity stereotyping were outside
the scope of Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination, and the
complainant appealed, requesting a determination of coverage from the
EEOC.77
expire, leaving the three positions vacant. Tom Spiggle, The Agency That Monitors
Employment Discrimination Just Lost Its Only Openly Gay Commissioner, FORBES (Feb. 19,
2019, 12:59 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomspiggle/2019/02/19/the-agency-thatmonitors-employment-discrimination-just-lost-its-only-openly-gaycommissioner/#6550e37
97e85. When a later confirmation of nominees takes place, only time will tell if Trump’s new
Republican majority will revisit and reverse Baldwin. Ben Penn and Tyrone Richardson,
Trump’s EEOC Takeover Stalled by Senate Republicans, BLOOMBERG (June 6, 2018),
https://www.bna.com/trumps-eeoc-takeover-n73014476247/; see Michael Joe, Trump’s proemployer picks to reorient EEOC’s priorities, NEW ORLEANS CTY BUS. (Feb. 9, 2018),
https://neworleanscitybusiness.com/blog/2018/02/09/trumps-pro-employer-picks-to-reorienteeocs-priorities/ (noting that the EEOC will be run by a Republican majority for the first time
in ten years).
72. The “EEOC interprets and enforces Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination as
forbidding any employment discrimination based on gender identity or sexual orientation.
These protections apply regardless of any contrary state or local laws.” What You Should
Know, supra note 15 (emphasis in original).
73. The short time frame runs from the 2012 decision in Macy v. Holder to the
recognition of full Title VII protections for LGBT employees in 2015.
74. Macy, E.E.O.C. Appeal No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *1 (April 20,
2012).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at *2–*3. At the time of the complaint, separate systems were in place for
addressing Title VII claims of sex discrimination and allegations of discrimination based on
gender identity and sexual orientation. Id. at *2. The latter system did not include the same
rights offered under Title VII and provided fewer remedial measures. Id. at *3. During the
appeal process, the complainant withdrew her claim related to sex discrimination in order to
proceed with an appeal to the EEOC regarding whether her claim of gender identity
stereotyping was permissible under Title VII. Id. at *4.
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The EEOC accepted the appeal, noting its “responsibilities under
Executive Order 1206778 for enforcing all federal EEO laws and leading the
federal government’s efforts to eradicate workplace discrimination” required
that the Commission “ensure that uniform standards be implemented
defining the nature of employment discrimination under the statutes [it]
enforce[s].”79 The Commission held that “claims of discrimination based on
transgender status, also referred to as claims of discrimination based on
gender identity, are cognizable under Title VII’s sex discrimination
prohibition.”80
Noting that “[a]s used in Title VII, the term ‘sex’ ‘encompasses both
sex . . . and gender,’”81 the Commission held that intentional discrimination
by an employer against a transgender employee constituted disparate
treatment “related to the sex of the victim” in violation of Title VII.82
Applying the 1989 Supreme Court holding in Price Waterhouse, the
Commission found that discrimination based on transgender status aligned
with the discrimination based on nonconformance with gender norms and
stereotypes that the Price Waterhouse Court found in violation of Title VII.83
The EEOC concluded that intentionally discriminating against a transgender
employee “is, by definition, discrimination ‘based on . . . sex’” and in
violation of Title VII.84
The Commission noted that disparate treatment in violation of Title
VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination occurs:
regardless of whether an employer discriminates against an
employee because the individual has expressed his or her
gender in a non-stereotypical fashion, because the employer
is uncomfortable with the fact that the person has
transitioned or is in the process of transitioning from one
78. Exec. Order 12067 of June 30, 1978, provides for the coordination of Federal Equal
Employment Opportunity programs. 43 FR 28967, 3 C.F.R., 1978 Comp., p. 206.
79. Macy, 2012 WL 1435995, at *4.
80. Id.
81. Id. at *5 (citing Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000) and Smith
v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 2004) (“The Supreme Court made clear that in
the context of Title VII, discrimination because of ‘sex’ includes gender discrimination.”)).
82. Id. at *7.
83. Id. at *7–*11. In Macy, the Commission specifically noted,
Since Price Waterhouse, courts have widely recognized the availability of the
sex stereotyping theory as a valid method of establishing discrimination ‘on the
basis of sex’ in many scenarios involving individuals who act or appear in
gender-nonconforming ways. And since Price Waterhouse, courts also have
widely recognized the availability of the sex stereotyping theory as a valid
method of establishing discrimination ‘on the basis of sex’ in scenarios
involving transgender individuals.
Id. at *7.
84. Id. at *11.
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gender to another, or because the employer simply does not
like that the person is identifying as a transgender person.85
The ruling specifically noted that regardless of the reason for the
discrimination, “the employer is making a gender-based evaluation” and
violating the Court’s admonition in Price Waterhouse that “an employer may
not take gender into account in making an employment decision.”86
In May 2013, the EEOC found that “[i]ntentional misuse of [a
transgender] employee’s new name and pronoun may cause harm to the
employee, and may constitute sex[-]based discrimination and/or
harassment.”87 In Jameson v. U.S. Postal Service, the Commission noted that
both “supervisors and coworkers” should address employees by the “gender
that the employee identifies with in employee records and in communications
with and about the employee.”88 A year later, the Commission held that an
employer’s failure or refusal to change an employee’s name to reflect his
legal name change based on his transition from female to male presented a
valid claim under Title VII’s sex discrimination prohibition.89 In Eric S. v.
Shinseki, the Commission found that the one-year delay after Complainant
requested the name change, combined with harassment related to the name
change request, evidenced an actionable claim of discrimination based on sex
in violation of Title VII.90
In March 2015, the EEOC also addressed bathroom access for
transgender employees in Lusardi v. McHugh.91 Applying Macy, the
Commission held that it is an unlawful violation of Title VII and constitutes
disparate treatment when an employer denies an employee equal access to a
restroom that conforms to the employee’s gender identity, or to harass an
employee who is transitioning gender.92 The Commission also clarified that
“nothing in Title VII makes any medical procedure a prerequisite for equal
opportunity” and held that an agency violates Title VII protections when it
conditions restroom access on anything other than the employee’s
notification of a change in gender.93

85.
86.
87.
2013).
88.
89.
2014).
90.
91.
2015).
92.
93.

Id. at *7.
Id. (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244 (1989)).
Jameson, E.E.O.C. Appeal No. 0120130992, 2013 WL 2368729, at *2 (May 21,
Id.
Eric S., E.E.O.C. Appeal No. 0120133123, 2014 WL 1653484, at *2 (Apr. 16,
Id.
Lusardi, E.E.O.C. Appeal No. 0120133395, 2015 WL 1607756, at *1 (Mar. 27,
Id. at *7–*8.
Id. at *8.
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The EEOC Brings its First Suits Challenging Discrimination
Based on Transgender Status/Gender Identity Under Title
VII94

In 2014, the EEOC began to file lawsuits challenging discrimination
against transgender employees, finding that such discrimination violated
Title VII. In EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., (“Harris
Funeral Home”), the EEOC brought its first action against a funeral home on
behalf of a transgender employee, alleging that the employee was fired based
on gender stereotypes in violation of Title VII.95 In Harris Funeral Home,
the employee was fired shortly after informing her employer that she was
transgender and would be transitioning from male to female and presenting
as female at work.96 The employee filed a claim with the EEOC alleging sex
discrimination under Title VII, and, following an investigation, the EEOC
issued a letter of determination finding reasonable cause to believe that the
funeral home fired the employee “due to her sex and gender identity, female,
in violation of Title VII[.]”97
The EEOC subsequently filed a Title VII sex discrimination
complaint against the funeral home alleging unlawful termination along with
a second claim related to employee clothing benefits.98 The funeral home
filed a motion to dismiss for failing to state a valid claim, and the district
court held that “transgender status is not a protected trait under Title VII,”99
and found that the EEOC could not pursue a claim for alleged discrimination
based solely on transgender and/or transitioning status.100 However, the
district court found that the Commission “[did] adequately state[] a claim for
discrimination” based on a failure to conform to “sex- or gender-based
preferences, expectations, or stereotypes.”101 Both parties moved for
summary judgment.102 The funeral home argued both that there was no
recognized sex discrimination claim for transgender status under Title VII
and that the Federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) precluded
the EEOC from bringing a Title VII claim because it would cause substantial

94. See supra note 31 and accompanying text; infra note 245 (discussing the Sixth
Circuit holding and recently granted certiorari petition).
95. EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 566–67 (6th Cir.
2018) (cert. granted).
96. Id. at 568–69.
97. Id. at 569.
98. Id. The EEOC also alleged that the funeral home discriminated against female
employees because it did not provide them with a clothing benefit like it did for its male
employees, in further violation of Title VII. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 569–70.
101. Id. at 570.
102. Id.
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burden to the defendant employer’s exercise of his sincerely held religious
beliefs.103
Addressing the employee’s firing, the district court found that there
was “direct evidence” of illegal Title VII discrimination based on sex.104
However, the court held that RFRA prevented the EEOC from suing on the
employee’s behalf because the court accepted the RFRA application of the
defendant and found the EEOC failed to show that enforcing Title VII was
the “least restrictive way to achieve its presumably compelling interest ‘in
ensuring that [the plaintiff was] not subject to gender stereotypes in the
workplace. . . .’”105 The EEOC appealed the district court’s decision that the
defendant was entitled to an exemption under RFRA from Title VII, and the
case moved on to review by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.106
In September 2014, the same month that the Harris Funeral Home
case was filed, the EEOC sued Lakeland Eye Clinic, (“Lakeland Eye”)
alleging it violated Title VII when the employer fired an employee based on
her transgender and/or transitioning status and/or because she did not
conform to the employer’s gender-based expectations, preferences, or
stereotypes.107
According to the EEOC’s lawsuit, the employee’s
performance was satisfactory throughout her employment.108 However,
when she started presenting as a woman at work and informed her employer
that she was transgender, Lakeland Eye fired her.109 Just over six months
after the filing, Lakeland Eye agreed to settle the case by entering into a
consent decree that included injunctive relief and $150,000 in damages.110
In June 2015, in a similar action, the EEOC sued Deluxe Financial
Services Corporation alleging that after its long-time employee informed
supervisors she was transgender and began to present at work as a woman,
the company refused to allow her access to the women’s restroom and
subjected her to a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII.111 As
part of a settlement agreement, the employer agreed to pay monetary
103. Id. at 567. Specifically, the funeral home alleged that the associated burdens
included that if the employee presented as female it “would create distractions for the
deceased’s loved ones” and would “forc[e] the Funeral Home to violate [its owner’s] faith,”
effectively causing him to “leave the funeral industry and end his ministry to grieving people.”
Id. at 586.
104. Id. at 570.
105. Id.
106. See supra note 31 and accompanying text; infra note 245 (regarding the Sixth
Circuit outcome and certiorari petition recently granted by the Supreme Court).
107. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, LAKELAND EYE CLINIC WILL PAY
$150,000 TO RESOLVE TRANSGENDER/SEX DISCRIMINATION LAWSUIT, 2015 WL 1612157
(April 13, 2015).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, DELUXE FINANCIAL TO SETTLE SEX
DISCRIMINATION SUIT ON BEHALF OF TRANSGENDER EMPLOYEE, 2016 WL 246967 (January
21, 2015).
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damages, and also agreed not to make exclusions in its healthcare benefits
plan for “otherwise medically necessary care based on transgender status,”
to revise employment policies with a focus on preventing unlawful sex
discrimination, and to provide employee training about unlawful sex
discrimination based on sex stereotypes, gender identity, and transgender
status.112
D.

The EEOC Extends Title VII Protections to Sexual Orientation

In July 2015, the EEOC expanded Title VII protections to LGBT
employees by holding that discrimination based on sexual orientation is also
a form of sex discrimination protected under Title VII.113 In Baldwin v. Foxx,
an employee alleged that he was subjected to discrimination in violation of
Title VII based on sex because of his sexual orientation when he was denied
a promotion.114 The EEOC determined that sexual orientation is, by its very
nature, discrimination because of sex under Title VII.115 The EEOC’s
opinion reasoned that discrimination based on sexual orientation falls within
the prohibitions contained in Title VII because (1) discrimination based on
sexual orientation “necessarily entails” less favorable treatment to employees
because of their sex; (2) discrimination based on sexual orientation harms
employees based on close associations with members of a particular sex, such
as dating or marrying a person of the same sex; and (3) discrimination based
on sexual orientation “necessarily involves” sex and gender norm
stereotypes.116
Addressing prior court holdings that distinguished “adverse
employment actions based on ‘sex’ from adverse employment actions based
on ‘sexual orientation,’” the Commission noted that stated justifications,
including the position that Congress did not intend for Title VII to apply to
sexual orientation protection when it passed the Civil Rights Act, fail based
on Supreme Court precedent.117 Citing the unanimous Court decision in
Oncale, the Commission quoted from the case, highlighting that “statutory
prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil . . . to cover reasonably
comparable evils.”118
Less than a year after Baldwin, the EEOC filed its first set of lawsuits
challenging discrimination based on sexual orientation as unconstitutional
under Title VII. In EEOC v. Scott Medical Health Center, P.C., the EEOC
112. Id.
113. Baldwin, E.E.O.C. Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *10 (July 15,
2015).
114. Id. at *1–*2.
115. Id. at *5. The EEOC specifically noted that, “[S]exual orientation is inherently a
‘sex-based consideration.’” Id.
116. Id. at *5–*7.
117. Id. at *8.
118. Id. at *9 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 79, 78–80
(1998)).
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sued an employer claiming that a gay male employee was constructively
discharged due to harassment in violation of Title VII based on his sexual
orientation for the three reasons the Commission identified in Baldwin.119
The EEOC also claimed that the employer failed to protect the employee
from the harassment, which resulted in the employee’s constructive
discharge.120 The defendant employer filed a motion to dismiss, claiming
Title VII did not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation, citing
to the Third Circuit for support.121 The EEOC directly responded that “[t]he
lack of express reference to sexual orientation in the statutory text is not
controlling.”122
The district court agreed, denied the motion, and held that sexual
orientation discrimination is protected by Title VII because it involves
discrimination “because of sex.”123 The court found that the EEOC’s three
prong argument from Baldwin regarding why sexual orientation
discrimination was prohibited under Title VII was simply the same argument
articulated in three ways, noting that the “singular question” is whether the
employee would have been subject to harassment “but for [his] sex.”124
Applying Price Waterhouse, the court found that “[t]here is no more obvious
form of sex stereotyping than making a determination that a person should
conform to heterosexuality.”125 Noting that “discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation is at its very core, sex stereotyping plain and simple,” the
federal court’s decision was consistent with the EEOC’s interpretation of
Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination.126
Similar to the Scott case, in EEOC v. Pallet Companies, (“Pallet”)
the EEOC filed suit asserting that the employer harassed and discriminated
against a former lesbian employee because of her sexual orientation in
violation of Title VII.127 In Pallet, the employee was fired in retaliation
shortly after she complained about the harassment to both management and
119. EEOC v. Scott Med. Health Ctr., P.C., 217 F. Supp. 3d 834, 836 (W.D. Pa. 2016).
See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
120. Scott, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 836.
121. Id. at 839. The defendant argued that the Third Circuit Court of Appeals had
“consistently held Title VII cannot be extended” to sexual orientation. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 839, 40–41.
124. Id. at 839.
125. Id. at 841. The court went on to address recent important legal developments,
including the legalization of gay marriage, indicating a “growing recognition of the illegality
of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.” Id. at 842 (citing Obergefell v. Hodges,
576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) and noting, “That someone can be subjected to a barrage
of insults, humiliation, hostility and/or changes to the terms and conditions of their
employment, based upon nothing more than the aggressor’s view of what it means to be a man
or a woman, is exactly the evil Title VII was designed to eradicate.” Id.
126. Scott, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 841.
127. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, IFCO SYSTEMS WILL PAY $202,200 IN
LANDMARK SETTLEMENT OF ONE OF EEOCS FIRST SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION
LAWSUITS, 2016 WL 3518330 (June 28, 2016).
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an employee hotline.128 In its first resolution of a suit challenging sexual
orientation discrimination, the EEOC settled the case with the employer
agreeing to pay $182,200 to the former employee and $20,000 to the Human
Rights Campaign Foundation.129 The consent decree also enjoined the
employer from engaging in sex discrimination or retaliation in the future and
required the employer to retain an expert on sexual orientation, gender
identity, and transgender training to assist in developing a training program,
among other injunctive relief.130
As evidenced by both the SEP and recent decisions addressing
federal employment discrimination, the EEOC has remained committed to
its position that Title VII protections include intentional discrimination based
on both gender identity and sexual orientation.131 While federal appellate
courts are not required to accept the EEOC’s interpretation, there is a
developing trend in the federal appellate courts that reflects the EEOC’s Title
VII interpretation.132
IV.

LOVE WINS: OBERGEFELL & MARRIAGE EQUALITY

On June 26, 2015, shortly before the EEOC extended Title VII
protection for sexual orientation discrimination in July 2015, the United
States Supreme Court released its opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges, holding
that both due process and equal protection guarantees under the United States
Constitution provided same-sex couples with the same marital rights as
opposite-sex couples.133 While the Obergefell landmark decision resolved
long-standing issues related to the marital rights of same-sex couples, it did
not raise or address LGBT employment rights, private or public, state or
federal.134 In the three-plus years since the White House lit up in rainbow
colors to celebrate the landmark holding, presidential administrations, federal
agencies, and federal courts have changed course, conflicted, disagreed, and
split regarding whether the scope of Title VII provides legal protections to
LGBT employees in the workforce.135
128. Id.
129. Id. (noting that the funds were to be directed to HRC’s Foundation to support the
Workplace Equality Program).
130. Id.
131. See Penn and Richardson, supra note 71 (addressing concerns regarding Trump’s
appointments to the Commission and possible impact).
132. See infra Section VIII (addressing the developing trend in the circuits finding Title
VII protections include discrimination based on gender identity, sexual orientation, or both).
See also, Tessa M. Register, The Case for Deferring to the EEOC’s Interpretations in Macy
and Foxx to Classify LGBT Discrimination as Sex Discrimination Under Title VII, 102 IOWA
L. REV. 1397 (2017).
133. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
134. Id.
135. See infra Sections VI and VII (addressing changing presidential administrations,
conflicts between agencies and with the administration) and Section VIII (addressing differing
holdings from federal courts of appeals).
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While the Obergefell decision provided a major advancement in
LGBT rights, the lack of protection available under Title VII for sexual
orientation discrimination has made it possible for an employer to legally
discriminate against LGBT employees as more and more come out at
work.136 Further, while there was great momentum advancing equality for
LGBT individuals, employees, and students under President Obama,
President Trump has taken several steps to undo and/or prevent further
advancements.137 Fortunately, several courts have taken Obergefell and
other LGBT legal advancements into consideration, along with changing
social attitudes and understandings toward the LGBT community,138
Supreme Court precedent addressing Title VII’s reach, and the EEOC’s
explicit efforts to provide employment protections to LGBT employees when
determining the proper application of Title VII.139
V.

PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATIONS, EXECUTIVE ORDERS &
LGBT PROTECTIONS

Executive orders are written directives from a United States
President that manage federal government operations.140 Because executive
orders are not legislation, congressional approval is not required.141
Beginning in 1995, LGBT employees received federal protections for the
first time when President Clinton issued Executive Order 12968, which
established criteria related to security clearances that included sexual
orientation in its non-discrimination language.142 The order noted that “[n]o
inference” could be made based on suitability for classified access “raised
solely on the basis of the sexual orientation of the employee.”143 Three years
later, President Clinton issued Executive Order 13087, which prohibited
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation by federal contractors and
subcontractors.144 While President Clinton’s executive orders were historic,
136. See, e.g., Section VIII(A) (discussing the Eleventh Circuit’s refusal to extend Title
VII protection to sexual orientation).
137. See infra Sections VI and VII.
138. See, e.g., Lisa J. Banks & Hannah Alejandro, Changing Definitions of Sex Under
Title VII, 32 ABA J. LAB. & EMPL. L. 25 (2016).
139. See infra Section VIII(B) and Section VIII(C) (discussing courts holding Title VII
does extend to sexual orientation).
140. Executive Orders 101: What are they and how do Presidents use them?, NAT’L
CONSTITUTION CTR. (Jan. 23, 2017), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/executive-orders-101what-are-they-and-how-do-presidents-use-them/.
141. Id.
142. Exec. Order No. 12968, 60 Fed. Reg. 40245 (Aug. 2, 1995). Standards, Section
3.1(c) states, “The United States Government does not discriminate on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, national origin, disability, or sexual orientation in granting access to classified
information.” Id.
143. Id. Section 3.1(d) states, in part, “No inference concerning the standards in this
section may be raised solely on the basis of the sexual orientation of the employee.” Id.
144. On May 28, 1998, President Clinton signed Executive Order 13087, amending
Executive Order 11478 from “or age” to “age, or sexual orientation.” U.S. EQUAL EMP’T
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it was not until another Democrat was in office that further advances were
made for LGBT employees through executive orders.
During President Obama’s two terms in office, beginning in January
2009, he furthered LGBT civil rights, and his “legacy of achievement for
LGBTQ people is unmatched by any president in American history.”145 In
2010, the Obama administration included gender identity among the
protected classes under EEOC authority.146 In 2012, the EEOC held that Title
VII prohibits gender identity-based employment discrimination because it is
a form of sex discrimination.147 On July 21, 2014, President Obama signed
Executive Order 13672, which added “gender identity” to protected
categories related to hiring in the federal civilian workforce and both “sexual
orientation” and “gender identity” to the categories protected in hiring and
employment of any company that contracts or subcontracts with the federal
government.148 The Order also required covered employers to add sexual
orientation and gender identity to their EEO policies and postings.149
Executive Order 13672 went into effect on April 8, 2015.150
During the Obama administration, the Department of Justice
(“DOJ”) deferred to the EEOC on issues regarding Title VII enforcement,
and the two agencies signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 2015

OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, Executive Order 13087: Further Amendment to Executive Order
11478, Equal Employment Opportunity in the Federal Government, https://www.eeoc.gov/
laws/executiveorders/13087.cfm (last visited Jan. 23, 2019). The stated purpose of Executive
Order 13087 was to “provide a uniform policy for the Federal Government to prohibit
discrimination based on sexual orientation.” Id. In a statement, President Clinton
acknowledged that the Order was limited to federal contractors and subcontractors as well as
legislative limitations noting, “The Executive Order states Administration policy but does not
and cannot create any new enforcement rights (such as the ability to proceed before the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission). Those rights can be granted only by legislation
passed by the Congress, such as the Employment Non-Discrimination Act.” Exec. Order No.
13087, 63 Fed. Reg. 30,097 (May 28, 1998); see generally Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and
Transgender Pride Month, LIBRARY OF CONG. (June 27, 2017), https://www.loc.gov/law
/help/commemorative-observations/pride.php (last visited Nov. 3, 2018).
145. HRC Staff, #ThanksObama: 23 Important Moments for LGBTQ Progress, HUMAN
RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (Dec. 22, 2016), https://www.hrc.org/blog/thanksobama-20-importantmoments-for-lgbtq-progress.
146. “Beginning in 2010, the Obama administration, through the Office of Personnel
Management, [had] started to list gender identity among the classes protected by federal Equal
Employment Opportunity (EEO) policies.” ADMINISTRATION ADDS GENDER IDENTITY
TO EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY POLICIES, ACLU (Jan. 5, 2010),
https://www.aclu.org/news/administration-adds-gender-identity-equal-employmentopportunity-policies.
147. See supra Section III(B).
148. Section 202 was revised by substituting “sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, or
national origin” for “sex, or national origin.” Exec. Order No. 13672, 79 FR 42971 (July 21,
2014).
149. Id.
150. Id. An Executive Order is executed without the input of Congress and can easily be
undone by a subsequent President. See Executive Orders 101, supra note 140.
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evidencing efforts to work together to achieve common objectives.151
Although the DOJ had ended its opposition to Title VII claims filed by
federal employees alleging discrimination based on gender identity, in
December 2014, shortly after President Obama issued Executive Order
13572, Attorney General Eric Holder issued a memorandum officially
declaring that the DOJ was taking a position that aligned with the EEOC:
Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination included discrimination based
on gender identity.152 In 2015, the EEOC concluded that Title VII prohibited
sexual orientation discrimination in employment because it is a form of sex
discrimination.153 Thus, under President Obama, both federal agencies
supported workforce protections to LGBT employees under Title VII for
discrimination based on gender identity and sexual orientation.
In 2013, the DOJ released a statement clarifying that it would no
longer defend Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, determining that it
was unconstitutional.154 In 2015, the DOJ wrote an amicus brief supporting
marriage equality in the Obergefell case, and the Solicitor General, in an
unprecedented move, argued in favor of same-sex marriage at the oral
arguments before the Court.155 On June 26, 2015, when the Supreme Court
151. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, Press Release: Justice Department and
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Sign Memorandum of Understanding to Further
the Goals of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Prohibiting Employment Discrimination
in State and Local Governments (Mar. 3, 2015), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/relea
se/3-3-15.cfm. Acting Assistant Attorney General Gupta commented at the signing, “The
MOU brings to life our vision to approach our shared Title VII enforcement responsibilities
as a partnership. It institutionalizes that partnership and provides a concrete framework for
expanding our collaborations and increasing our effectiveness in protecting the employment
rights of public sector workers.” Id.
152. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Press Release: Attorney General Holder Directs Department to
Include Gender Identity Under Sex Discrimination Employment Claims (Dec. 18, 2014),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-holder-directs-department-include-genderidentity-under-sex-discrimination [hereinafter “DOJ Press Release”].
153. See supra Section IV(D).
154. In a press release dated February 23, 2011, Attorney General Holder noted,
“[P]ursuant to the President’s instructions, and upon further notification to Congress, I will
instruct Department attorneys to advise courts in other pending DOMA litigation of the
President’s and my conclusion that a heightened standard should apply, that Section 3 is
unconstitutional under that standard and that the Department will cease defense of Section 3.”
Letter from the Att’y Gen. to Congress on Litigation Involving the Defense of Marriage Act,
DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Feb. 23, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/letter-attorney-generalcongress-litigation-involving-defense-marriage-act.
155. The DOJ amicus brief stated in part:
A prime part of the history of our Constitution . . . is the story of the extension
of constitutional rights and protections to people once ignored or excluded.
Here, petitioners seek the duties and responsibilities that are an essential part
of married life that opposite-sex couples, and tens of thousands of same[-]sex
couples, already enjoy. The laws they challenge exclude a long-mistreated
class of human beings from a legal and social status of tremendous import.
Those laws are not adequately justified by any of the advanced rationales. They
are accordingly incompatible with the Constitution.
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ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, the White House was awash in rainbow colors
to celebrate the ruling.156 Toward the end of its second term, the Obama
administration provided guidance to educators to treat claims of transgender
students as sex discrimination.157 By the end of President Obama’s second
term, the LGBT community had experienced a tidal wave of positive change,
including being safely “out” in the military, the right to marry nationwide,
and workplace protections under Title VII that were supported by both the
EEOC and the DOJ.158
In 2017, almost immediately after President Trump’s inauguration,
the Trump administration changed course and began to turn back advances
put into motion under President Obama. The Trump administration, through
the DOJ, took a much more restrictive view of LGBT rights and quickly
reversed the Obama-era policy which used Title VII to provide protection to
gay and transgender employees from discrimination.159 While the EEOC and
DOJ were in agreement under the Obama administration, the Trump
administration not only took an opposing view regarding Title VII
protections for LGBT employees, but also deviated from the Obama
administration’s DOJ deference to the EEOC regarding Title VII issues.160
In fact, under the Trump administration, the DOJ would take opposing
positions in federal court cases, including arguing against the EEOC’s
position through conflicting amicus briefs.161
VI.

FEDERAL AGENCIES AT ODDS: EEOC VERSUS DOJ

While the Trump presidential administration implemented changes
in policy across many governmental agencies, senior representatives of the
EEOC stressed that the agency’s SEP, which is in place through 2021, will
remain the guidepost for the types of cases and issues on which the EEOC

Br. for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Pet’rs, pg. 35, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S.
___, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (internal citations omitted).
156. Allie Malloy and Karl de Vriesl, White House shines rainbow colors to hail samesex marriage ruling, CNN POLITICS (June 30, 2015), https://www.cnn.com/2015/06/26/
politics/white-house-rainbow-marriage/index.html.
157. In a letter released on May 13, 2016, by the Civil Rights Department in the DOJ and
the Department of Education, the administration provided guidance to treat transgender
student claims as sex discrimination. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE AND U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., Civil
Rights Division, Dear Colleague Letter on Transgender Students (May 13, 2016),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201605-title-ix-transgender.pdf.
158. See supra text accompanying note 8, and Sections III and IV.
159. On October 4, 2017, Attorney General Jeff Sessions issued a directive that withdrew
the 2014 Holder memorandum. Attorney General Sessions stated as a matter of law, “Title
VII does not prohibit discrimination based on gender identity per se.” Sessions Memo supra
note 26.
160. Alan Feuer, Justice Department Says Rights Law Doesn’t Protect Gays, N.Y. TIMES
(July 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/27/nyregion/justice-department-gaysworkplace.html.
161. See infra Section VI. See also Feuer, supra note 160.
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will focus, including workplace protections for LGBT employees.162
Nonetheless, although the EEOC is committed to its strong stance that Title
VII prohibits discrimination against employees based on LGBT status, under
President Trump the DOJ has retreated from its prior stance that was in
agreement with the EEOC’s position and issued guidance attempting to
enforce an opposite interpretation, arguing that discrimination based on
sexual orientation is not prohibited under Title VII.163
In Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., the Second Circuit addressed
stereotyping based on sexual orientation discrimination, including the
parameters of Title VII’s offered protections.164 In Zarda, a three judge panel
affirmed a lower court decision holding that sexual orientation was not
protected under Title VII based on binding precedent.165 The panel
acknowledged that only the Supreme Court or an en banc panel of the Second
Circuit could overrule the existing precedent.166 Subsequently, the Second
Circuit granted en banc review.167 The EEOC filed an amicus brief in the
case, arguing that Title VII did provide protections for sexual orientation,
setting out its argument from Baldwin.168
In a highly unusual move, the DOJ filed an amicus brief with the
Second Circuit, arguing that Title VII did not provide protections for sexual
orientation, the opposite position of the EEOC’s amicus brief.169 In the brief,
the DOJ suggested that the Second Circuit should not be persuaded by the
EEOC’s position because “the EEOC is not speaking for the United States
and its position about the scope of Title VII is entitled to no deference beyond

162. See generally What You Should Know, supra note 15 (explaining Title VII
protections available for discrimination based on gender identity and sexual orientation, and
noting that “[a] growing number of court decisions have endorsed the Commission’s
interpretation of Title VII”). See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
163. See supra Section V. See also Aesil Kim, The DOJ’s New Posture on Gender
Identity Discrimination, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.labor
employmentperspectives.com/2017/11/14/the-dojs-new-posture-on-gender-identitydiscrimination.
164. Zarda v. Altitude Express, 855 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2017), reh’g en banc granted, (May
25, 2017), on reh’g en banc sub nom., Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir.
2018). For a full discussion of the Zarda case, see Section VIII(C), infra.
165. Id. at 81–82 (acknowledging that a three-judge panel did not have the power to
overturn Second Circuit precedent holding that Title VII did not prohibit discrimination based
on sexual orientation).
166. Id. at 82.
167. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 100.
168. Brief of Amicus Curiae Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in Support of
Plaintiffs/Appellants and in Favor of Reversal at 4, Zarda v. Altitude Express, 883 F.3d 100
(2d Cir. 2018) (No. 15-3775) (addressing discrimination based on sexual orientation and
noting that “[b]ecause such claims necessarily involve impermissible consideration of a
plaintiff’s sex, gender-based associational discrimination, and sex stereotyping, the EEOC
believes they fall squarely within Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination on the basis of
sex”).
169. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Zarda v. Altitude Express, 883 F.3d
100 (2d Cir. 2018) (No. 15-3775).
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its power to persuade.”170 The DOJ’s amicus brief noted that the essential
element of “sex discrimination under Title VII is that employees of one sex
must be treated worse than similarly situated employees of the other sex, and
sexual orientation discrimination simply does not have that effect.”171 While
the DOJ conceded that sexual stereotyping claims state a claim under Title
VII, it asserted that sexual orientation was not a cognizable claim under Title
VII.172 Shortly after filing its Zarda amicus brief, the DOJ announced that it
would no longer provide protection for transgender employees under Title
VII as the previous Obama administration had.173
Thus, unlike the Obama administration, which was in harmony with
the EEOC regarding Title VII workplace protections, Trump’s
administration has taken a directly contrary position.174
VII.

A BIZARRE & IRRECONCILABLE POST-PRICE
WATERHOUSE/ONCALE OUTCOME:
ONLY TRANSGENDER INDIVIDUALS & STEREOTYPICAL GAY MEN &
LESBIANS ARE ENTITLED TO TITLE VII DISCRIMINATION
PROTECTIONS—GENDER IDENTITY VERSUS SEXUAL ORIENTATION
Prior to Price Waterhouse, Title VII protections from discrimination
based on both gender identity and sexual orientation were not cognizable
claims in federal court.175 However, the majority of the circuit courts postObergefell that have addressed the issue have held that the Supreme Court’s
holdings in Price Waterhouse and Oncale permit transgender employees to
present a valid claim of discrimination “based on . . . sex” under Title VII,
although claims of discrimination based on sexual orientation have not
received the same treatment.176 Further, while both gender identity and
sexual orientation are now clearly covered under Title VII according to the
170. Id. at 9.
171. Id. at 30.
172. Id. at 26.
173. See DOJ Press Release, supra note 152; Kim, supra note 163.
174. See, e.g., infra Section VIII (addressing competing amicus briefs filed in the Second
Circuit Zarda case).
175. See, e.g., Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that sexual
orientation is not cognizable under Title VII) (overruled by Zarda, 883 F.3d at 100); Dawson
v. Bumble, 398 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2000) (overruled by Zarda, 883 F.3d at 100); Hamm v.
Weyauwega Milk Prods., 332 F.3d 1058 (7th Cir. 2003) (overruled by Hively v. Ivy Tech
Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017); Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. and Health
Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2000) (overruled by Hively, 853 F.3d at 339); Spearman
v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080 (7th Cir. 2000) (overruled by Hively, 853 F.3d at 339). For
a detailed history of LGBT rights pre-Price Waterhouse, see Stacy L. Cole & Tyler S.
Gregston, The Changing Landscape of LGBT Employment Rights: A Battle Over Title VII,
STATE BAR OF TEX. (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.stacycolelaw.com/docs/07_cole.
pdf.
176. See, e.g., infra Section VIII(A) discussing the Eleventh Circuit, which has held that
Title VII does prohibit discrimination based on gender identity but not based on sexual
orientation.
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EEOC, federal courts are not bound by the Commission’s decisions and have
reached opposing outcomes regarding whether Title VII protects against
sexual orientation discrimination.177
In 2004, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals was the first federal
circuit to adopt a broad interpretation of the Court’s Price Waterhouse
holding when it applied the sex stereotyping theory to a transgender
employee claiming discrimination because of sex.178 In Smith v. City of
Salem, an employee claimed he was suspended from work based on sex after
he notified his employer that he was transitioning from male to female and
began presenting at work as feminine.179 The Sixth Circuit, en banc, held
that transgender employees are protected from discrimination based on
gender stereotyping under Title VII after the Price Waterhouse Court
“eviscerated” earlier jurisprudence finding Title VII discrimination based
solely on a narrow, traditional view of sex.180 One year later, an employee
alleged that he was demoted from his police job due to his transgender status
when he presented as an effeminate man on-duty but often lived as a female
off-duty.181 In Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, the Sixth Circuit, applying Smith,
held that the employee had stated a claim of sex discrimination under Title
VII, clarifying that discrimination based on gender nonconformity violated
Title VII “irrespective of the cause of that behavior.”182
While Price Waterhouse and Oncale led appellate courts to
determine that gender identity protections were available under Title VII
based on gender nonconformity, courts did not extend such protections to
employees based on sexual orientation discrimination, resulting in an
imbalanced outcome.183 Because the Supreme Court cases focused on sexual
stereotyping and held that basing an employment decision on gender was
prohibited under Title VII, transgender employees, overtly effeminate men,
and masculine women qualified for Title VII protections, while gay or
lesbian employees who presented in accordance with the stereotype of his or

177. See supra note 21.
178. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2005) (en banc). It is interesting to
note that in both Supreme Court cases, the employee alleging discrimination was a
heterosexual person who was discriminated against because each did not present according to
normal social stereotypes. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
179. Smith, 378 F.3d at 568–69.
180. Id. at 572–73.
181. Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 733–35 (6th Cir. 2004).
182. Id. at 737 (quoting Smith, 378 F.3d at 575).
183. See infra Section VIII. See, e.g., Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1254–
55 (11th Cir. 2017) (acknowledging that “discrimination based on gender non-conformity is
actionable” under Title VII but holding that “binding precedent foreclosed” an action for
sexual orientation protection under Title VII, citing an almost forty-year-old pre-Price
Waterhouse case), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 557 (2017).
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her gender were not protected from discrimination based on sexual
orientation under Title VII.184
This confusing and inconsistent outcome has led to what Judge
Posner referred to as a “curious distinction” between Title VII claims
asserting gender identity or sex stereotyping discrimination and claims
asserting sexual orientation discrimination.185
Judge Posner further
commented that “[t]he case law as it has evolved holds . . . that although Title
VII does not protect homosexuals from discrimination on the basis of their
sexual orientation, it protects heterosexuals who are victims of ‘sex
stereotyping’ or ‘gender stereotyping.’”186 Some courts have recognized this
convoluted outcome and taken steps to overrule prior contradictory decisions
to provide protections based on both gender identity and sexual orientation
in the wake of recent Supreme Court cases furthering LGBT rights and
changing social values.187 The Seventh Circuit’s en banc opinion noted,
“Especially since the Supreme Court’s recognition that the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution protect the right of same-sex
couples to marry, bizarre results ensue from the current regime.”188 The

184. While most circuit courts hold that Title VII does not extend to sexual orientation
discrimination, many circuit courts addressing the issue do recognize discrimination based on
gender non-conforming behavior at work or affecting job performance, including “appearance
or mannerisms on the job.” Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 763 (6th Cir. 2005).
As of the date of this writing, “[f]our circuit courts covering twenty states hold that
discrimination based on sex includes discrimination against transgender people.” LGBT
Employees & Title VII, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT (June 2018), https://www.lgbtm
ap.org/file/Title-VII-Two-Pager.pdf. In contrast, there are currently only two circuit courts
that “hold that Title VII protections extend to sexual orientation.” Id.
185. Judge Posner noted in his concurrence that “the case law has gone off the tracks in
the matter of ‘sex stereotyping.’” Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prod., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1066
(7th Cir. 2003), overruled by Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir.
2017).
186. Hamm, 332 F.3d at 1066.
187. In the Hively en banc opinion holding that Title VII did extend to sexual orientation,
vacating the three-judge panel denial of protection based on existing precedent, Chief Judge
Wood commented, “Our panel frankly acknowledged how difficult it is ‘to extricate the
gender nonconformity claims from the sexual orientation claims,’” noting that it “has led to a
‘confused hodge-podge of cases.’” Hively, 853 F.3d at 342 (internal citation omitted). In its
opinion, the three panel Hively court addressed EEOC criticism of federal courts that cited
“earlier and dated decisions without any additional analysis” by stating, “We take to heart the
EEOC’s criticism of our circuit’s lack of recent analysis on the issue” and noted, “The
EEOC’s criticism has created a groundswell of questions about the rationale for denying
sexual orientation claims while allowing nearly indistinguishable gender non-conformity
claims, which courts have long recognized as a form of sex-based discrimination under Title
VII.” Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 830 F.3d 698, 699, 704 (7th Cir. 2016), as
amended (Aug. 3, 2016), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 15-1720, 2016 WL
6768628 (7th Cir. Oct. 11, 2016), reh’g en banc, 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017).
188. Hively, 853 F.3d at 342 (en banc) (citing Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ____, 135
S. Ct. 2584 (2015)).
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resulting outcome has led to inconsistent and inequitable outcomes, a split
among the federal circuits, and a split between federal agencies.189
VIII. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT POST-OBERGEFELL: DOES TITLE VII
PROHIBIT EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION BASED ON SEXUAL
ORIENTATION? THE CURRENT STATE OF THE CIRCUITS AND THE
TREND TOWARD FULL LGBT PROTECTIONS UNDER TITLE VII
Although claims under Title VII for sexual orientation
discrimination did not receive the same treatment as claims based on gender
identity post-Price Waterhouse and Oncale, in 2017 and 2018 two circuit
courts, in en banc reviews, overruled contradictory precedent and held that
Title VII in fact does prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation.190
During the same timeframe, one circuit, addressing the issue twice in a
fifteen-month period, held that sexual orientation does not fall under the
ambit of Title VII protections, denying an en banc review both times.191 A
third approach by a circuit court has been to find a Title VII violation in a
“sex-plus” claim when the “plus” is discrimination based on sexual
orientation.192
This growing trend in recent appellate court decisions expanding
LGBT protections under Title VII is attributed to the Supreme Court’s
expansive holdings in Price Waterhouse and Oncale, changes in the social
climate, the EEOC’s determination that Title VII applies to gender identity
and sexual orientation, and the recognition of a constitutional right to samesex marriage. At the time of this writing, the Court just granted two certiorari
petitions requesting review to determine whether sexual orientation
discrimination is protected under Title VII, which will be heard in the 2019–
20 term.193 While the Court denied a certiorari petition from the Eleventh
Circuit in the 2017–18 Term addressing an identical issue,194 in the following
and immediate past 2018–19 Term another petition from the Eleventh Circuit
was filed before the Court, but this time it was joined by a petition from the
Second Circuit.195 The en banc decision from the Seventh Circuit, holding
that Title VII does provide protections based on sexual orientation
189. See supra Section VI re: conflicting agency determinations and infra Section VIII
re: conflicting circuit court decisions.
190. Hively, 853 F.3d 339 (en banc); Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d
Cir 2018), cert. granted, No. 17-1623, 2019 WL 1756678, at *1 (U.S. Apr. 22, 2019).
191. Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct.
557(2017); Bostock v. Clayton Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 723 F. App’x 964, 964–65 (11th Cir.
2018), reh’g en banc denied, 894 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, No. 17-1618, 2019
WL 1756677 (U.S. Apr. 22, 2019).
192. Franchina v. City of Providence, 881 F.3d 32, 54 (1st Cir. 2018).
193. Zarda, 883 F.3d 100; Bostock, 894 F.3d 1335. See supra note 31 and accompany
text.
194. Evans, 850 F.3d 1248.
195. See supra note 191 and text accompanying.
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discrimination, was not appealed, resulting in current Title VII protections
for discrimination based on sexual orientation in three states.196
Until the Supreme Court issues an opinion to resolve the issue, the
federal courts will remain split and employers and employees will remain
uncertain regarding the level of protection, or lack of it, provided by Title
VII. Further, until the Court provides resolution, a determination regarding
whether workplace discrimination protections are available to LGBT
employees will continue to be determined by a patchwork of factors,
including where the employee lives and whether the employment is state or
federal, leading to differing and unequal outcomes.
A.

Post-Obergefell Appellate Decisions Denying Title VII
Protection Extends to Sexual Orientation: The Eleventh
Circuit

In March 2017, the Eleventh Circuit was the first federal appellate
court to address Title VII’s prohibitions related to sexual orientation and
gender nonconformity post-Obergefell and following the EEOC’s
determination that Title VII did prohibit discrimination based on sexual
orientation and gender identity.197 In Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital,
the Eleventh Circuit addressed a former lesbian security officer’s claim that
she was harassed due to her sexual orientation and because she did not
present herself in a “traditional woman[ly] manner.”198 The district court
dismissed the complaint sua sponte and the employee appealed.199 While
acknowledging that “discrimination based on gender non-conformity is
actionable” under Title VII,200 the Eleventh Circuit held that the genderbased claim failed because the plaintiff “did not provide enough factual
matter to plausibly suggest that her decision to present herself in a masculine
manner led to the alleged adverse employment actions.”201 Without
evaluating Title VII in light of the EEOC’s findings or examining Supreme
Court advances in LGBT rights, the Evans court held 2–1 that “binding
precedent foreclosed” an action for sexual orientation protection under Title
196. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 351–52 (7th Cir. 2017).
Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin are the three states that comprise the Seventh Circuit. United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/aboutcourt/about-court.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2018).
197. Obergefell was decided June 26, 2015. See supra Section IV. The EEOC made its
determinations in 2012 regarding protections based on gender identity and in 2015 regarding
protections based on sexual orientation. See supra note 74. The Eleventh Circuit case was
decided in 2017. See infra note 198.
198. 850 F.3d 1248, 1251 (11th Cir. 2017) (alteration in original).
199. Id. at 1253.
200. Id. at 1254 (acknowledging that “discrimination against a transgender individual
because of gender nonconformity was sex discrimination” post Price Waterhouse) (citing
Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2011)).
201. Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1254 (11th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138
S. Ct. 557 (2017).
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VII, citing an almost forty-year-old pre-Price Waterhouse case.202 Clarifying
that it was bound by the pre-Price Waterhouse precedent “unless and until it
is overruled by [the Eleventh Circuit] en banc or by the Supreme Court,”203
the Eleventh Circuit rejected an en banc review.204 On December 11, 2017,
the Supreme Court denied certiorari.205
Fourteen months later, in Bostock v. Clayton, the Eleventh Circuit
gave short shrift to an employee’s appeal from the dismissal of his claim of
discrimination under Title VII based on sexual orientation and gender
stereotyping.206 Without reviewing Title VII’s history and again relying on
a forty-year-old precedent decided prior to Price Waterhouse, the court held
that “[d]ischarge for homosexuality is not prohibited by Title VII,” that its
recent holding in Evans confirmed Eleventh Circuit precedent, and the court
affirmed the district court in a brief, unpublished decision, and the Eleventh
Circuit again denied an en banc review.207 In her dissent from the denial of
the en banc rehearing, Judge Rosenbaum addressed the “considerable
calisthenics” necessary to find that gender identity was protected under Title
VII while sexual orientation was not.208 In May 2018, the Bostock employee
filed a petition for certiorari requesting that the Supreme Court resolve
whether Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination “because . . . of sex”
includes discrimination based on sexual orientation.209
202. Id. at 1256 (noting that an almost forty-year-old case, Blum v. Gulf Oil Co., 597 F.2d
936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979), precluded a Title VII action for sexual orientation discrimination).
203. Id. at 1255 (internal citations omitted).
204. Id. (rehearing and rehearing en banc denied Jul. 6, 2017). While the Second and
Seventh Circuits addressed the issue and overturned prior conflicting precedent to find that
sexual orientation protections were available under Title VII, the Eleventh Circuit relied on
existing forty-year-old precedent precluding such a holding and denied en banc review in both
cases before the court in a one-year span. In Evans, Judge Rosenbaum addressed changes in
the application of Title VII, distinguishing between “ascriptive stereotyping,” which she
identified as the concern when Title VII was enacted, and “prescriptive stereotyping,” which
Price Waterhouse and Oncale address. Id. at 1262 (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting). Similarly, in
Bostock, Judge Rosenbaum condemned the Eleventh Circuit’s denial of an en banc review
and commented, “I have previously explained why Price Waterhouse abrogates Blum and
requires the conclusion that Title VII prohibits discrimination against gay and lesbian
individuals because their sexual preferences do not conform to their employers’ views of
whom individuals of their respective genders should love.” Bostock v. Clayton Cty. Bd. of
Comm’rs, 894 F.3d 1335, 1337–38 (11th Cir. 2018) (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting).
205. See Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 138 S. Ct. 557 (2017).
206. Bostock v. Clayton Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 723 F. App’x 964, 964–65 (11th Cir.
2018), reh’g en banc denied, 894 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2018).
207. Id.; See Kenneth A. Pilgrim, Two Wrongs Don’t Make It Right: Title VII, Sexual
Orientation, and the Misuse of Stare Decisis, 52 GA. L. REV. 685, 686 (2018) (arguing that
federal appellate courts “should not invoke stare decisis to avoid [addressing Title VII
prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination], and instead should evaluate the merits of this
issue anew, taking into account intervening developments in the law”).
208. Bostock, 894 F.3d at 1339 (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting).
209. See Bostock v. Clayton Cty., No. 17-1618, 2019 WL 1756677, at *1 (U.S. Apr. 22,
2019). The petition was originally distributed for conference on September 24, 2018. It was
distributed again on November 30, 2018, and numerous times prior to the Court’s recent grant
of certiorari on April 22, 2019. The final distribution for conference took place on April 18,
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The First Circuit: Sex “Plus” Sexual Orientation Claim
Constitutes Discrimination Under Title VII

In the January 2018 case of Franchina v. City of Providence, the
First Circuit concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support a “sexplus” discrimination claim under Title VII where the “plus” in the lesbian
plaintiff’s case was her sexual orientation.210 A “sex-plus theory” addresses
instances where “an employer classifies employees on the basis of sex plus
another characteristic.”211 In Franchina, a lesbian firefighter was regularly
subjected to extreme name calling, physical assaults, and inappropriate and
vulgar behavior by coworkers.212 She sued, alleging Title VII violations
based on a hostile work environment and retaliatory discharge.213 A jury
found the employee was discriminated against based on both her gender and
in retaliation for complaining about the treatment, and it awarded her front
pay and emotional damages.214 The city appealed, arguing, among other
things, that the employee failed to show evidence of gender discrimination
and that the bulk of her evidence focused on sexual orientation
discrimination, which was not protected under Title VII.215
The Franchina court disagreed, holding that even if Title VII did not
expressly protect sexual orientation discrimination in that jurisdiction, an
employee could still bring a “sex-plus” claim when the alleged conduct
involved the employee’s sex “plus” the additional fact of being a lesbian.216
Consequently, in sex-plus claims, the existence of sexual orientation
discrimination does not negate a sex discrimination claim under Title VII in
the First Circuit if the alleged discriminatory conduct is based, even in part,
on gender.217 Although the First Circuit did not explicitly equate sexual
orientation discrimination with discrimination based on sex, a sex-plus claim
provides an avenue to extend Title VII protections to sexual orientation
discrimination.
2019. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, Docket Search: No. 17-1618,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/public/17-1618.html (last visited
May 5, 2019).
210. 881 F.3d 32, 54 (1st Cir. 2018).
211. Id. at 52 (emphasis in original).
212. Id. at 37–44.
213. Id. at 45–46.
214. Id. at 37–38.
215. Id. at 53–54. The First Circuit noted that “such sexual orientation bigotry, the
argument goes, does not enjoy Title VII protection under Higgins v. New Balance Athletic
Shoe, Inc., a nearly twenty-year-old-case in which we concluded that Title VII does not
proscribe harassment based solely on one’s sexual orientation.” Id. at 54 (citing Higgins v.
New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 258–59 (1st Cir. 1999)).
216. Id. at 54 (“And we see no reason why claims where the ‘plus-factor’ is sexual
orientation would not be viable if the gay or lesbian plaintiff asserting the claim also
demonstrates that he or she was discriminated at least in part because of his or her gender.”)
(emphasis in original).
217. Id.

32
C.

BELMONT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:2: 1

The Growing Trend: Title VII Prohibits Discrimination Based
on Sexual Orientation

In 2018, two different federal circuits revisited the issue and released
en banc decisions with similar holdings that Title VII protections do extend
to discrimination based on sexual orientation.218 In order to do so, the full
Second and Seventh Circuits reviewed prior panel decisions and circuit
precedents holding that under Title VII a sexual orientation claim was not
cognizable, and both courts overruled precedent holding those claims were
not permissible.219 While the Second Circuit case was recently granted
certiorari by the Supreme Court, the employer in the Seventh Circuit case
chose not to file a petition for certiorari, making sexual orientation
discrimination claims cognizable under Title VII in Illinois, Indiana, and
Wisconsin.
1.

The Seventh Circuit’s En Banc Review

Less than a month after the Eleventh Circuit’s Evans holding, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, issued a ground-breaking
decision as the first federal circuit to hold that Title VII prohibitions against
workplace discrimination do extend to sexual orientation.220 In Hively v. Ivy
Tech Community College, a part-time adjunct professor filed a charge with
the EEOC alleging that she was passed over for full-time job positions and
that her part-time position was not renewed due to discrimination based on
her sexual orientation.221 She received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC
and filed a complaint in federal district court.222 The defendant college filed
a motion to dismiss arguing that Title VII did not extend protections based
on sexual orientation, and the district court granted the motion.223
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ three judge panel
affirmed the district court, noting that binding precedent precluded any other
outcome and recognizing that based on stare decisis, the court must continue
“to extricate the gender nonconformity claims from the sexual orientation
claims.”224 The panel urged the full court to reconsider its precedents and
218. See infra Section VIII(C)(1) and (2).
219. Id.
220. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017).
221. Id. at 341. Her complaint identified several positions she had applied for at Ivy Tech
during the prior five-year period and her belief that she did not receive the positions based on
discrimination due to her status as a lesbian. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 342–43 (citing Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. and Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224
F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir. 2000) to note that “harassment based solely upon a person’s sexual
preference or orientation (and not on one’s sex) is not an unlawful employment practice under
Title VII” and Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1062 (7th Cir. 2003),
to note that “[t]he protections of Title VII have not been extended . . . to permit claims of
harassment based on an individual’s sexual orientation”).
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noted that the “[current regime] creates ‘a paradoxical legal landscape in
which a person can be married on Saturday and then fired on Monday for just
that act.’”225
The adjunct professor petitioned the Seventh Circuit to rehear the
case en banc, the full court voted to rehear the case, and it vacated the earlier
three panel ruling.226 Recognizing that “[f]or many years, the courts of
appeals of this country understood [Title VII’s] prohibition against sex
discrimination to exclude discrimination on the basis of a person’s sexual
orientation,”227 the Seventh Circuit commented that “[e]specially since the
Supreme Court’s recognition that the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Constitution protect the right of same-sex couples to marry,
bizarre results ensue from the current regime.”228 The court identified the
issue before it as “whether passage of time and concomitant change in
attitudes toward homosexuality and other unconventional forms of sexual
orientation can justify a fresh interpretation of the phrase
‘discriminat[ion] . . . because of . . . sex’ in Title VII” and noted that
“fortunately” the “half-century-old statute [was] ripe for reinterpretation.”229
Noting that the question of “whether actions taken on the basis of sexual
orientation are a subset of actions taken on the basis of sex” was one of
“pure . . . statutory interpretation” and one “well within the judiciary’s
competence,” the en banc court thoroughly reviewed its precedent in light of
Price Waterhouse, Oncale, Obergefell, Loving, and recent EEOC
decisions.230
Noting that “[i]t would require considerable calisthenics to remove
the ‘sex’ from ‘sexual orientation,’” the Seventh Circuit overruled prior
contrary cases and held that sexual orientation was protected under Title VII:
[T]his court sits en banc to consider what the correct rule of
law is now in light of the Supreme Court’s authoritative
interpretations, not what someone thought it meant one, ten,
or twenty years ago. The logic of the Supreme Court’s
decisions, as well as the common-sense reality that it is
actually impossible to discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation without discriminating on the basis of sex,
persuade us that the time has come to overrule our previous
cases that have endeavored to find and observe that line.

225. Hively, 853 F.3d at 342 (quoting Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 830 F.3d 698, 714
(7th Cir. 2016)).
226. Hively, 853 F.3d at 350–52.
227. Id. at 340.
228. Id. at 342 (citing Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ____, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015)).
229. Id. at 356.
230. Id. at 342–44.
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...
We hold only that a person who alleges that she experienced
employment discrimination on the basis of her sexual
orientation has put forth a case of sex discrimination for Title
VII purposes.231
As the very first circuit to do so, the Seventh Circuit held 8–3 that
discrimination based on sexual orientation is, in fact, sex discrimination
under Title VII.232 The defendant college did not file a petition for certiorari
requesting review of the case by the Supreme Court. Thus, absent a
contradictory decision from the Supreme Court, employees who live in the
three states comprising the Seventh Circuit are protected from discrimination
based on both gender identity and sexual orientation.
2.

The Second Circuit’s En Banc Review

Unlike the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Evans, the Second Circuit,
sitting en banc, closely tracked the Seventh Circuit’s Hively decision and the
EEOC’s Baldwin decision to hold that Title VII does prohibit sexual
orientation discrimination.233 In Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., a former
skydiving instructor alleged that he was unlawfully fired for being gay and
sued his employer alleging discrimination under Title VII based on sexual
orientation.234 A three-judge panel noted that it was constrained by Second
Circuit precedent holding that Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination
did not extend to sexual orientation, so it affirmed the district court.235 The
Second Circuit subsequently granted en banc review.236 The en banc court
held 10–3 that Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation as a subset of discrimination on the basis of sex.237 Overturning
prior contrary precedent, the Second Circuit held that “[i]n the context of
231. Id. at 350–52.
232. Id.
233. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 132 (2d Cir. 2018).
234. Id. at 108–09.
235. Id. at 107 (citing Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000) and Dawson
v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 217–18 (2d Cir. 2005)). The three-judge panel issued the
initial decision in Zarda shortly before the Seventh Circuit released its en banc decision in
Hively. The Hively decision recognized that only an en banc court could reverse the Second
Circuit’s decision in Simonton, which held that sexual orientation is not a protected category
under Title VII. Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2000). Shortly thereafter, the
Second Circuit agreed to hear Zarda en banc.
236. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 100.
237. Id. at 108. In a plurality decision, four judges joined in full, five joined in part, and
three dissented. Eight of the thirteen judges issued an opinion. For a detailed analysis of the
Zarda opinion, see Arthur S. Leonard, 2nd Circuit, En Banc, Votes 10-3 That Sexual
Orientation Discrimination Violates Federal Employment Discrimination Law, 2018 LGBT
L. NOTES 103 (2018).
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Title VII, the statutory prohibition extends to all discrimination ‘because
of . . . sex’ and sexual orientation discrimination is an actionable subset of
sex discrimination.”238
Aligning itself with the EEOC’s Baldwin decision and the recent
Seventh Circuit’s en banc Hively decision, the Second Circuit utilized three
separate theories to reach its conclusion that sexual orientation
discrimination is a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII.239 The
three theories employed by the Zarda court include a “because of sex” theory,
a “sex stereotype” theory, and an “associational discrimination” theory.240
When addressing the “because of sex” theory, the court used a plain language
approach to Title VII that prohibits discrimination “because of . . . sex” and
found that sexual orientation discrimination is included in the language.241
The Second Circuit extended the “sex stereotype” theory first recognized in
Price Waterhouse to apply to sexual orientation, concluding that
homosexuality “represents the ultimate case of failure to conform to gender
stereotypes.”242 Finally, addressing the “associational discrimination” theory
established in Loving v. Virginia,243 the court found that Title VII extends to
sexual orientation because it prohibits discrimination that an employee
suffers as a result of his or her association with another, including with a
same sex-partner.244
IX.

THE NEXT STOP: SUPREME COURT REVIEW

On April 22, 2019, the Supreme Court granted two certiorari
petitions presenting the similar questions of whether Title VII protects
against sexual orientation discrimination.245 The cases out of the Second and

238. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 132.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 113–28. For a detailed analysis of the court’s holding and rationale in Hively,
see Kenneth A. Pilgrim, Two Wrongs Don’t Make It Right: Title VII, Sexual Orientation, and
the Misuse of Stare Decisis, 52 GA. L. REV. 685 (2018).
241. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 113–19.
242. Id. at 119–23.
243. Id. at 123–28.
244. Id. at 132.
245. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. A third certiorari petition was filed on
July 20, 2018, and granted certiorari on April 22, 2019, in the R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral
Homes, Inc. v. EEOC case. No. 18-107, 2019 WL 1756679, *1 (U.S. Apr. 22, 2019). In Harris
Funeral Home, the Sixth Circuit held that “Title VII protects transgender persons because of
their transgender or transitioning status, because transgender or transitioning status constitutes
an inherently gender non-conforming trait.” Leonard, supra note 237, at 162. The similar, but
different, issue raised in the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari was
(1) Whether the word ‘sex’ in Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination
‘because of . . . sex,’ 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), meant ‘gender identity’ and
included ‘transgender status’ when Congress enacted Title VII in 1964; and (2)
whether Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), prohibits
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Eleventh Circuits reach opposite outcomes, possibly persuading the justices
that it was necessary to take the cases and resolve the split. While the Second
Circuit en banc decision is a very detailed analysis of Title VII protections,
as well as its history and progression over the past fifty years,246 the Eleventh
Circuit decision simply restates its 2017 Evans conclusion that forty-year-old
pre-Price Waterhouse/Oncale binding precedent precluded a different
outcome.247 Further, although the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that the
only way to change the precedent was for a Supreme Court decision or an en
banc review, that court refused both times to address the issue en banc.248
Although there were two certiorari petitions filed and recently
granted certiorari addressing sexual orientation protections available under
Title VII, three federal circuits have addressed the issue.249 Like the Second
Circuit, the Seventh Circuit, also, sitting en banc, re-evaluated Title VII as it
relates to sexual orientation, and overruled conflicting precedent, holding
that sexual orientation discrimination is subject to federal protection under
Title VII.250 However, unlike the Second Circuit case, the Seventh Circuit
case was not appealed to the Supreme Court. The Eleventh Circuit, the only
post-Obergefell circuit that is currently in disagreement, has addressed the
issue twice in the last two years finding both times that four-decade-old
precedent precluded Title VII protection for sexual orientation, leading to a
negative decision both times and creating the split in the circuits.251
While the Supreme Court denied a certiorari petition last year in the
Eleventh Circuit Evans case, the Bostock employee from the current Eleventh
Circuit case filed a certiorari petition to appeal the court’s same holding that
discrimination based on sexual orientation is not cognizable under Title
employers from applying sex-specific policies according to their employees’
sex rather than their gender identity.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Harris Funeral Home, 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018) (No. 18107), 2018 WL 3572625, *i. The limited issue the Court granted certiorari to determine is
“[w]hether Title VII prohibits discrimination against transgender people based on (1) their
status as transgender or (2) sex stereotyping under Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U. S.
228 (1989).” R. G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc. v. Equal Opportunity Employment
Commission, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/r-g-g-r-harris-fun
eral-homes-inc-v-equal-opportunity-employment-commission/ (last visited May 5, 2019). A
second issue discussed in Harris Funeral Home is whether a RFRA defense can be
successfully raised against the EEOC for enforcing Title VII against an employer with a
religious objection regarding continued employment of a transgender employee. The Sixth
Circuit held that it could not. This issue was not included in the Court’s certiorari grant. For
a thorough analysis of the Harris Funeral Home decision, see Leonard, supra note 237.
246. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017).
247. Bostock v. Clayton Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 723 F. App’x 964 (11th Cir. 2018), reh’g
en banc denied, 894 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2018).
248. 894 F.3d 1335.
249. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 100; Hively, 853 F.3d at 339; Bostock, 723 F. App’x 964, cert.
denied, 894 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2018).
250. See supra Section VIII.
251. Id.
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VII.252 The issue presented to the Court in the petition was “[w]hether
discrimination against an employee because of sexual orientation constitutes
prohibited employment discrimination ‘because of . . . sex’ within the
meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2.”253 The case was distributed on August 29, 2018, and originally scheduled
for conference on September 24, 2018.254 After being rescheduled multiple
times, the Court granted certiotari to both the Second and Eleventh Circuit
court cases on April 22, 2019.255
Four days after the Bostock petition was filed, the second certiorari
petition was filed with the Court. However, in Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc.,
the employer appealed the Second Circuit’s en banc review that held Title
VII prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation, a holding directly
opposite to that of the Eleventh Circuit.256 The issue presented to the Court
in the Zarda certiorari petition is identical to the Bostock issue, but presented
in a slightly different manner: “Whether the prohibition in Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), against employment
discrimination ‘because of . . . sex’ encompasses discrimination based on an
individual’s sexual orientation.”257 The case was distributed on September
5, 2018, and scheduled for conference on September 24, 2018.258 However,
like the Bostock conference setting, the case was rescheduled for conference
numerous times before the Court granted certiorari on April 22, 2019
The reason for the conference rescheduling by the Court is unknown.
The National Law Journal published an article on September 24, 2018, the
day of the original conferencing schedule, speculating that it may have been
due to the open seat on the Court after Justice Kennedy’s recent retirement
and the desire to avoid a possible 4–4 holding.259 However, that concern is

252. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 2017 WL 4456898 (N.D.
Ga. 2017) (No. 17-1618) 2018 WL 2456150.
253. Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, SCOTUS BLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/
case-files/cases/bostock-v-clayton-county-georgia/ (last visited May 5, 2019).
254. Id.
255. See, e.g., Tony Mauro, Awaiting a Ninth Justice, Supreme Court Tinkers With Its
Docket, NAT’L LAW J. (September 24, 2018, 09:56 AM), https://www.law.com/nationallaw
journal/2018/09/24/awaiting-a-ninth-justice-supreme-court-tinkers-with-its-docket/ (noting
that the Court “tinker[ed] with its docket”).
256. 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018).
257. Altitude Express Inc. v. Zarda, SCOTUS BLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/casefiles/cases/altitude-express-inc-v-zarda/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2018). The Zarda certiorari
petition was filed on May 29, 2018.
258. Id.
259. Acknowledging that “the [C]ourt does not explain why it reschedules or delays the
consideration of pending petitions,” the article stated that “it might be that the prospect of an
eight-member court in the short or long term led the justices to shelve cases that might result
in 4-4 ties.” The article further noted that “Justices traditionally try to avoid ties because they
have the effect of allowing the lower court ruling to stand, without further resolution of the
issue involved” and speculated that the indecision surrounding the most recent Supreme Court
nominee, Brett Kavanaugh, may be the reason for the delay. Mauro, supra note 255.
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no longer viable since the Court now has all nine Justices on the bench.260
Thus, the current split in the federal courts of appeal, along with the split
among federal agencies, likely helped to persuade the Court that the issue
was ripe and it needed to be addressed and resolved sooner rather than later.
X.

THE NEED FOR CONSISTENCY, CERTAINTY & EQUALITY
POST-OBERGEFELL

The current state of Title VII protections for LGBT employees is
fraught with inconsistency, uncertainty, and inequality. Federal circuits are
split, and federal agencies are also in direct conflict.261 Employers,
employees, courts, legal counsel, and agencies are in need of clarity and
consistency. Further, as the EEOC and two en banc appellate courts have
noted, in light of social changes and Supreme Court advancements for the
LGBT community in the more than fifty years since Title VII was enacted, it
is time for employment law to keep up with those developments.262
The EEOC has made great strides to fulfill its mission of equality in
the workforce through its application of Price Waterhouse and Oncale. The
Second and the Seventh Circuit en banc opinions provide the most extensive
evaluations of Title VII’s prohibitions since the combination of Price
Waterhouse, Oncale, Obergefell, and other societal advancements afforded
LGBT Americans. Both courts overruled existing contradictory precedent
and held that Title VII does in fact provide protection from discrimination
based on sexual orientation to employees.263 As both circuits have correctly
held, it is simply not possible to separate discrimination based on sexual
orientation from discrimination based on sex.264 It is also inconsistent and
nonsensical to provide employment protections to transgender individuals,
effeminate gay men, and masculine lesbians while denying the same
260. Adam Liptak & Noah Weiland, Justice Kavanuagh Takes the Bench on the Supreme
Court, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/09/us/politics
/justice-brett-kavanaugh-supreme-court.html.
261. See supra Sections VI and VIII.
262. See supra Sections III and VIII(C).
263. Id.
264. The Hively court wrote:
The Court made clear that “[t]he critical inquiry . . . is whether gender was a
factor in the employment decision” when it was made. So, if discriminating
against an employee because she is homosexual is equivalent to discriminating
against her because she is (A) a woman who is (B) sexually attracted to women,
then it is motivated, in part, by an enumerated trait: the employee’s sex. That
is all an employee must show to successfully allege a Title VII claim.
853 F.3d 339, 359 (7th Cir. 2017). The Zarda court noted that “[b]ecause one cannot fully
define a person’s sexual orientation without identifying his or her sex, sexual orientation is a
function of sex. Indeed sexual orientation is doubly delineated by sex because it is a function
of both a person’s sex and the sex of those to whom he or she is attracted.” Zarda v. Altitude
Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 113 (2d Cir. 2018).
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protections to gay men and lesbians who present according to social norms
assigned to his or her birth sex.
The Supreme Court has expressly held that sex and gender must be
“irrelevant to employment decisions” to stay in compliance with Title VII.265
As the Hively and Zarda courts have noted, it is simply not possible to
discriminate against a lesbian without taking her sex into account.266
Therefore, whenever an employer discriminates against an employee based
on sexual orientation, the employer has acted “because of . . . sex” and is in
violation of Title VII.267 Although the Court denied certiorari during the
2017–18 Term to an Eleventh Circuit case denying Title VII protection based
on sexual orientation, another case from the same circuit was filed the
following year with an almost identical petition and will be addressed by the
Court during the 2019–20 Term.268 This time the Eleventh Circuit petition
was not alone. It was joined by a petition from the Second Circuit that also
addressed sexual orientation but with an opposing outcome.269 Additionally,
because the Seventh Circuit Hively case has not been appealed, that court’s
holding is a final outcome for three states absent a contradictory holding from
the Supreme Court. In light of the current circuit split and the federal
agencies at odds, the Court’s intervention is timely and necessary. Hopefully
the Court will resolve the Title VII issue in favor of LGBT workers, leading
to further protections and equality for LGBT citizens as they continue to gain
legal rights and acceptance in mainstream society.
Ideally, the Court will recognize the injustice that takes place when
a lesbian exercising her now constitutional right to marry can put her family
and job in jeopardy should her employer find out about and disapprove of her
marriage. Just as discriminatory practices are precluded for heterosexual
employees, African American employees, and Jewish employees, among
others, lesbian, gay, and transgender employees should have equal protection
from discrimination in the workplace.
Along with marriage equality, the Supreme Court bestowed dignity
on a group that has experienced more than its share of indignity and
disrespect. As Justice Kennedy poignantly penned in the Obergefell decision,
“They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants

265. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239–40 (1989) (“ . . . because of such
individual’s . . . sex. We take these words to mean that gender must be irrelevant to
employment decisions”).
266. See Hively, 853 F.3d at 359; Zarda, 883 F.3d at 113.
267. Id.; see Katie R. Eyer, Sex Discrimination Law and LGBT Equality, https://www.
acslaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Sex_Discrimination_Law_and_LGBT_Equality.pdf
(last visited Sept. 28, 2018) (arguing that “faithful application of established antidiscrimination law doctrine leads inevitably to the conclusion that sexual orientation and
gender identity discrimination are also sex discrimination.”).
268. Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1250 (11th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138
S. Ct. 557 (2017).
269. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. See also Section VIII(C)(2).
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them that right.”270 LGBT Americans have, at last, lost the title of “deviant”
and been granted constitutional rights previously denied.271 Employment
discrimination laws have simply not kept up with advances in LGBT rights.
The current state of Title VII is demeaning to gay and lesbian employees,
confusing to employers and employees alike, and plainly unequal. As
President Kennedy eloquently noted in 1963, we are, again, “confronted . . .
with a moral issue . . . as old as the scriptures and . . . as clear as the American
Constitution.”272 More than fifty years after the Civil Rights Act of 1964
introduced Title VII and equality into the workforce, it is time to extend those
same protections to all LGBT employees and “treat [those] fellow Americans
as we want to be treated. . . .”273 It is time for employment laws to catch up
with and to reflect the same values of equality and dignity that the Obergefell
Court addressed.274

270. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015).
271. See id. at 2596 (noting that “[f]or much of the 20th century . . . homosexuality was
treated as an illness,” and “classified as a mental disorder” and that “[o]nly in more recent
years have psychiatrists and others recognized that sexual orientation is both a normal
expression of human sexuality and immutable”); see also, Regina M. Lambert & Abby R.
Rubenfeld, Deviant to Dignified: From Campbell v. Sundquist to Tanco v. Haslam - The
Progression of LGBT Rights & Marital Equality in Tennessee, 83 TENN. L. REV. 371, 454
(2016) (noting that the Obergefell “majority opinion’s penultimate paragraph affirms the
dignity, respect, and humanity finally afforded to gay individuals. Those same citizens who
were, less than three decades earlier, referred to and treated as deviant or as criminals, were
finally afforded the dignity they deserve.”).
272. Radio and Television Report to the American People on Civil Rights (John F.
Kennedy, The White House June 11, 1963) (on file with John F. Kennedy Presidential Library
and Museum).
273. Id.
274. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 2608.

